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ABSTRACT <p>After five decades of ongoing Naxalite insurgency, the Indian Government has embarked upon the Effects Based Approach, focusing on inclusive and holistic development of the insurgent infested areas. Intelligence based precision operations are providing safe and secure environment to the populace. Socioeconomic reforms are focusing on eradicating the root causes of the insurgency, while keeping the specific needs and concerns of the affected populace in mind. The safe, secure, and progressive environment in the insurgent affected areas is isolating the insurgents from their support bases. Drastic reduction in violent incidents, impressive economic growth, and increased standards of literacy in the known hotbeds of Naxalite insurgency are some of the positive indicators of the efficacy of the EBA strategy. The multipronged Effects Based Approach undertaken by the Indian Government in a methodical manner has eradicated the root causes of the insurgency to a great extent and stopped the spread of Naxalite insurgency which would not have been possible by employing a narrowly focused approach relying solely on political or military means towards the insurgency.</p>			
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**EFFICACY OF EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS
ON MAOIST COIN OPERATIONS IN INDIA**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR PRAMOD GAHLOT, INDIAN ARMY

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Executive Summary

Title: Efficacy of Effects Based Operations on Maoist COIN Operations in India

Author: Major Pramod Gahlot, Indian Army

Thesis: Effects Based Operations focusing on inclusive and holistic development of the insurgent infested areas keeping in mind their specific needs and concerns of the affected sections of the society has been able to control the spread of Maoist (Naxalite) insurgency in India.

Discussion: After five decades of futile COIN operations against the Naxalite insurgents, the Indian Government has embarked upon the Effects Based Approach. Professional and well equipped security forces are being employed to undertake intelligence based precision operations to safeguard the populace from the insurgent onslaught. On the other hand, socioeconomic reforms are being implemented across the country, with special emphasis on the insurgence infested areas by undertaking comprehensive development packages. The inclusion of the local populace in the planning and execution of the development schemes is isolating the insurgents from their support bases. A large segment of the population living in abject poverty has been benefitted by such schemes to have a positive impact regarding the government's policies and has distanced them from the insurgency. Drastic reduction in violent incidents and impressive economic growth in the known hotbeds of Naxalite Insurgency are some of the positive indicators of the efficacy of the EBA strategy until the trends continue and culminate in complete eradication of the insurgency. However, the Indian Government's investments in the backward and tribal areas are not yielding desired dividends due to corrupt and slow-paced political and bureaucratic system. However, the honest and effective implementation of the EBA while avoiding corruption and bureaucratic delays which mar the present Indian COIN strategy against Naxalism will surely bring success.

Conclusion: The multipronged Effects Based Approach undertaken by the Indian Government in a methodical and region specific manner has eradicated the root causes of the insurgency to a great extent and stopped the spread of Naxalite insurgency which would not have been possible by employing a narrowly focused approach relying solely on political or military means towards the insurgency.

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PREFACE

For decades now, India has been confronting the Naxalite insurgency. The Naxalite insurgency has become the gravest internal security threat to India. Naxalites have their presence in 16 of the 28 Indian states today. Previous Indian strategies of predominantly military or socioeconomic solutions which were applied in the 1970s till late 1990s failed to bring an enduring peace in the affected areas.

The Naxalites enjoy the support of the vast Indian proletariat and have established liberated zones in the Dandkaryna and Abhujmar region of India. The insurgents are effectively exploiting the underdeveloped rural areas to incite the oppressed and exploited populace belonging to lower castes or tribal areas to take up arms and effect a regime change in India. However, the availability of the political option due to recognition of communism in India as well as the different regional interests of the insurgent cadres, the Naxalites have failed to put up a unified front till now.

The Indian Government's undertaking of an Effects Based Approach, which encompasses region specific tailor made politico-military options have brought in a welcome change. Professionally trained and well equipped security forces are undertaking intelligence based surgical operations to provide safe and secure environment, while inclusive development is being undertaken by comprehensive development packages to improve the living standard of the affected populace. The EBA is not only countering the insurgency, but also empowering the affected populace with education and multiple self help employment opportunities to make them invulnerable to the exploitative the feudal elites and supportive of the government's cause.

This paper cements the efficacy of the whole of the government approach in COIN and brings to light the importance of unified command under the overall leadership of the civilian leadership of a country in COIN.


This paper would not have been possible without Dr Eric Y Shibuya, Ph.D, who allowed me to have ample leeway in planning my research and then very patiently reviewed my work and guided me throughout the completion of this paper. I am indebted and grateful for his guidance and continuous encouragements. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Jonathan F Phillips, Ph.D the second reader and Lieutenant Colonel Shawn P. Callahan, US Marine Corps, my military faculty adviser for painstakingly reviewing my work and helping me with wonderful insights to help in refining the paper.

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Introduction

The Maoist insurgency or more commonly known as the Naxalite Insurgency in India began as a modest peasant uprising in Naxalbari District in the state of West Bengal in India in 1967.¹

Communist ideologies drove the movement,² which envisioned a spontaneous mass uprising all over India to create a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) extending from South India all the



Map 1 : Expanse of Naxalite Insurgency
Source : India's Maoist Challenge, Indian
Institute of Strategic Studies

way up to Nepal (see Map 1).³ Oppressive tactics and the indifferent attitude of the successive central and state governments in neutralizing the root causes of the problem fueled the peasant uprising, which grew into a larger and violent Naxalite insurgency. The movement today boasts of having influence in 16 out of 28 Indian states.⁴ The government's pursuit of vigorous economic reforms and stern police actions has reduced the frequency of violent incidents but the Naxalites are still inclined to further their cause with vigor. Not

only the proletariat, but also members of the intelligentsia such as Arundhati Roy (winner of Booker Prize),⁵ students,⁶ and some urban upper caste people openly support Naxalism. The movement also draws strong ideological and material⁷ support from the South Asian Maoist and terrorist organizations. India has lately realized the magnitude of Naxalism to regard it as the gravest security threat; and has resorted to a population-centric approach to counter the Naxalite insurgency.⁸

The widespread support of the portions of affected populace for the Naxalite ideology of violence⁹ has forced the Indian Government to balance the use of firepower with population-centric means to curtail the steady rise of Naxalism seen since the 1990s. After turning a blind eye towards Naxalism for five decades the Indian Central Government has now opted for a multipronged approach to address this problem. The Central and State Police Forces (CPF and SPF) are being retrained and reequipped with the help of Indian Army and elite Special Forces to carry out intelligence-based precision operations. Simultaneously, broad-spectrum inclusive development by the government is focusing on eradicating the widespread socio-economic inequality and improving the infrastructure and governance.

This paper will analyze the Indian counter insurgency (COIN) strategy of employing Effects Based Approach (EBA) to counter Naxalism in India. The first part will trace the root causes of the Naxalite Insurgency back to Indian Independence in 1947, and discuss the communist influence in shaping the insurgency. The first part will also analyze the Indian Government's initial response to the problem during the peasant struggle of 1960 to 1970. The second part will describe the situation and factors leading to the resurgence of the insurgency in the 1990s. The third part will first describe the concept of Effect Based Approach and then compare it with the Indian strategy in vogue to counter the Naxalite Insurgency. The fourth part will analyze the countermeasures undertaken by the Indian Government supported by statistical data to measure the effectiveness of the EBA. The conclusion will summarize the root causes of the conflict and the efficacy of Indian EBA in countering the Naxalite Insurgency and the likely future prospects of the Naxalite Insurgency.

Causes of Origin and Growth of Naxalism

India inherited a semi-feudal agrarian economy on its independence from the British in 1947. A small group of elite Zamindars (landowners) and Sahukars (intermediaries) owned the land and extracted exaggerated rent, either in cash or in kind, from the tenant farmers.¹⁰ Sahukars subjected the poor to further exploitation by lending money at high interest rates and buying the farm produce at abysmally low prices. India also lacked in various aspects vital for societal development, such as education and infrastructure among the majority of the states.¹¹ The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, instituted land reforms for equal distribution of arable land and launched the Green Revolution to increase the agricultural production and boost the economy.¹² Two major pieces of legislation for land reform were enacted in the 1950s to eliminate the Zamindars and Sahukars. The reforms were good in principle but the ruling elite influenced the execution of the laws in their favor and retained large tracts of arable land.¹³ Ironically, the number of tenants declined to around 20% by early 1960s, but this was only due to eviction of the tenants and not by actual reforms. The land reforms failed to bring succor to the vast tribal populace, forcing it to either live off the forest produce or accede to the feudal hierarchy. Over a period, India gained self-sufficiency in food grains and a modest growth in the economy, but the fruits of these reforms failed to permeate to the lowest strata of the society and exacerbated the divide between the rich and the poor.

The tribal and lower castes (Dalits) also faced social discrimination and degrading treatment at the hands of upper caste elites.¹⁴ The indigent conditions, coupled with rigid caste-based social stratification enforced by the elites, forced the tribals and dalits into a never-ending spiral of class struggle that strengthened the position of the elites, ensuring easy availability of cheap bonded labor with minimum defiance. In addition to that, the forest dwelling tribals with

forest produce as their main source of livelihood were also subjected to financial and physical exploitation at the hands of corrupt forests rangers and other government officials in the garb of forest conservation. The situation became more appalling because of the virtually nonexistent redressal of grievance due to corruption and the uncontested influence of the feudal elites over the administration.

On 25 May 1967, in Naxalbari District of West Bengal, an eminent and charismatic ideologue¹⁵ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) {CPI (Marxist)} Charu Majumdar known as father of Naxalism¹⁶ stimulated a peasants' protest in Naxalbari District of West Bengal (W.B.). Their protest was for increased share in the crops produced and the land rights to the tillers. The impoverished peasants instigated by Charu Majumdar, chose to take the law in their own hands against the feudal elites under the slogan "land to the tiller".¹⁷ However, police opened fire on the peasants, killing nine adults and two children, which turned the modest peasant uprising into an insurgency. The peasant uprising appealed to the revolutionary ideas of the CPI (Marxist), and similar uprisings followed in several states of India, namely Bihar, Andhra Pradesh (A.P.), Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Kerala, Karnataka, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), and Tamil Nadu (T.N.). The CPI (Marxist)-led United Front government in W.B. quelled the uprising by employing Indian Army and SPF.¹⁸ However, the reliance on kinetic means and dereliction of the root causes of the problem by the successive Indian governments kept the movement alive.¹⁹

Unsound policies and the ineffective execution of some well-considered policies polarized the proletariat against the elites even more. The Prevention of Violent Activities Act in 1970 mandated relocating the tribals to dampen the popular support for Naxalism. Nominating forests as protected wildlife sanctuaries also prohibited the use of forests for non-forest use, to

stifle the means of survival in the forests. The Indian Government also tried to bring in big development projects such as dams, industries, and mines in the underdeveloped areas so improve the standard of living of the affected populace; however, the development projects resulted in internally displaced population due to the policy of relocation. The State's policy of mass relocation of tribals away from the forests with inadequate rehabilitation measures took away their sole source of food, exacerbating their pecuniary conditions even more, and put the tribal way of life in total disarray.

The Communist ideologies also found enormous appeal among the youth due to increasing unemployment and the lackluster economy of the 1960s and 1970s.²⁰ The premier educational institutions across the country became crucibles of radical ideology, churning out motivated leaders. Kanu Sanyal, Koteswar Rao alias Kishenji, Ramakrishna, and Kobad Gandhi are some examples of charismatic Naxalite leaders. The inability of the successive governments to resolve the deep-rooted socio-economic inequality, forced relocation of peoples to new areas, and the employment of kinetic means expanded the Naxal support base and legitimized the demands of the insurgents. In spite of the government's socioeconomic reforms the insurgency has spread its base unabated amongst the society's poor strata as the Naxalites do cater for the people's basic needs through Janta Sarkar (People's Government), which was established in the liberated areas such as the Dandkaranya (DK) and Abhujmar.²¹

Naxalism aims to establish communist rule in India by means of protracted guerilla warfare. The CPI (Maoist) spearheading the Naxalite insurgency favors the Maoist ideology of mass revolution for agrarian reforms, restoration of tribal rights, and anti-imperialism. However, the Naxalite insurgency since its inception has been marred with factionalism and division, rather than projecting a united front. This is due to the recognition of communism as a political

movement by India. The popularity of communist ideology with the masses and the communist rule over the states of W.B. and Kerala inspired many regional groups to exercise the political option rather than violence to attain their political objectives. The clash of differing ideologies and preference for violence and political options within the ranks of the Naxalites resulted in the formation of the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in 1968. This effort to bring harmony failed, and the organization disintegrated into Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI (ML)] and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) in 1969.²²

The Central Government resorted to a search and destroy operation codenamed Operation Steeplechase to quell the Naxalite uprising in the state of West Bengal in 1971. The operation involved the Indian Army as the outer cordon while the SPF cleared the inner area. The operation successfully subdued the uprising owing to the overwhelming firepower of the Indian Army and the SPF compared to the primitive weapons such as bow and arrows wielded by the tribals.²³ However, the key leaders of the movement such as Charu Majumdar and Kanahi Chatterjee managed to escape and continued the propaganda to spread the narrative of peasant's struggle.²⁴

The internal ideology conflicts divided the Naxalite cadres in 1970s into smaller groups, which further disintegrated into small regional movements fighting for their respective problems with the death of Charumajumdar in 1972. The vestiges of the insurgency learned from the earlier debacles and used a facade of peasant organizations, cultural groups, and student and worker unions to organize mass gatherings and strikes to educate the masses. The Naxalites enlisted other left-wing organizations, ethnic insurgent groups, and factional movements such as Telangana and Chattisgarh to further their cause²⁵ and shifted their base from the plains of W.B.

to hilly and forested Dandkaranya (DK) region of Eastern India. This enabled the Naxalites to spread their narrative within the populace of Telangana and Chattisgarh regions to exploit their demand for a separate state and securing sanctuary in uninhabited and difficult terrain of DK.²⁶

The apparent inaction on the part of the Naxalites during this period enticed the central and state governments into complacency; and no remedial actions were taken to prevent a resurgence of the insurgency.²⁷ In the 1980s various movements conflated to form bigger groups. The prominent factions that emerged were the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation [CPI (ML) Liberation] and People's War Group (PWG). MCC also managed to revive itself under the leadership of Kanhai Chaterjee and started collecting taxes, forced distribution of land, and punishing the defying populace in the people's courts.

In the year 2000, the central government separated the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar states to form the new states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand assuming that a smaller state would have appropriate representation of the affected populace in the electorate, which will alleviate the tribal grievances. On the contrary, the Naxalites exploited the weak administration of the new states to swell the strength of insurgent cadres and soon established a "people's government" in many districts. In June 2001, the Naxals established strong international linkages by forming an international organization called the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia. The organization not only coordinates monetary and material support among Maoist organizations in South Asian countries but also vows to establish a broad front against the imperialist powers across the world.²⁸ The year 2005 subsequently became a major milestone in history of Naxalism as two prominent Naxalite factions operating in states of Bihar and A.P. the MCC and PWG, united to form CPI (Maoist).²⁹ The formation of CPI

(Maoist) began daring and violent attacks on the SPF, and soon vast swaths of the forested areas of Eastern and Central India covering nine states came under the Naxalite influence.

The CPI (Maoist) announced DK as a liberated zone with its own people's government boasting of agriculture, trade and industry, economics, justice, defense, health, public relations, education and culture, and forests departments. The Naxalites follow the Maoist organization, having a Politburo and Central Committee as the highest governing bodies over the regional committees. The People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) is the military wing. The military wing is organized in regular army (military) and guerilla groups based on the Mao's teachings. The military groups are further organized in platoons and companies whereas the guerilla groups are comprised of the front organizations such as the village committees and peasants and workers associations. The state government officials have been driven out or killed by the Naxalites and the regional committees administers the entire DK liberated zone through divisions, area committees, and village committees.

The sudden growth of Naxalism in area and influence after 2005 has enabled fast progress through the phases of insurgency. The Naxalites extort protection money from the mining industries and government officials and levy tax on the forest produce extracted by the tribals to fund their campaign. Training camps, logistic bases, and recruitment and indoctrination centers function unabated within the DK liberated Zone to spread Naxalite propaganda and enlist popular support. The Naxalite cadre has increased in number since 1990s and is presently approximated to be around 10,000 to 40,000 strong, taking into account the various splinter groups across the country.³⁰ The Naxalites have demonstrated their resolve and power by conducting bold and direct attacks with military precision on SPF such as the raid on Jahanbad Jail in Bihar³¹ and Silda Camp³² and Dantewada attacks³³ killing 100 SPF soldiers. Naxalite

attacks such as Silda and Dantewada give a semblance of well-trained military attacks involving immense firepower ranging from rural primitive weapons to sophisticated automatic weapons and even rocket launchers.³⁴ The Naxalite's burgeoning power has placed them in a comfortable spot to graduate the Naxalite insurgency to the next step towards its political objective.

In addition to the increased kinetic capabilities, the ideology of Naxals also reflects the paradigm shift from the erstwhile altruistic peasant movement to that of a national insurgency seeking a Maoist Government in Delhi. The next phase envisions transformation of the PLGA into a full-fledged People's Liberation Army (PLA) and encircling the cities, with the liberated zones to form a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) encompassing the complete red corridor from Kerala all the way up to Nepal. Figure 1 shows the rise of Naxalism after formation of MCC in 2005.³⁵




Figure 1: Civilian killings due to Naxal violence after formation of MCC in 2005³⁶

The state governments have tried various lines of operations against the Naxal tide with very little success. Vast sweeping operations by the SPF to clear the Naxal hideouts, raising specialized units like "Grey Hound" in A.P., and employing Salwa Judum, the right wing militia in Chhattisgarh are some of the kinetic means employed. The state governments also brought in big industrial and mining projects to hasten the economic development.³⁷ However, all actions have proved counterproductive to the states until now. SPF and Salwa Judum have fed the

insurgent's propaganda by unleashing excessive violence on the tribes.³⁸ Sulwa Judum, riding on the vengeful emotions and lack of adequate training tend to commit atrocities on the population supportive of Naxal cause. On the other hand, the SPF carry out wide sweeping operations in overwhelming numerical superiority, instead of intelligence based surgical operations. This strategy of SPF gives the Naxals gain prior intelligence of any impending operation thus enabling an easy get away.

The state government also tried to isolate the affected populace from the insurgents in strategic hamlets on the lines of British in Malaya and French in Algiers. However, the state government which was responsible for managing the relocation camps have failed miserably in this plan. Sulwa Judum responsible for rounding up the populace in the targeted region resorted to repressive measures and human rights violations, which merely helped the insurgents in recruit more cadres. Whereas, the state government has been blamed for shoddy management of the relocation camps with unhygienic living conditions and an utter lack of basic amenities making the relocation camps as recruiting centers for the insurgents. Poorly planned and executed development projects have resulted in millions of internally displaced persons who are bereft of shelter, basic amenities, and livelihood, thus increasing the woes of the tribes. In addition to that, the industrial firms have become taxpayers to the insurgents to buy security and continuing business.

Naxalism is a reflection of the anguish and dissent simmering within the Indian proletariat. Even after 50 years of democratic governance, India is still struggling to improve the living standards of its populace. Whereas, the economic progress has predominantly benefited the elites, and the impoverished class has only grown in size with the increasing population. The Communist ideology of the leftwing extremists fueled the popular demand of "land to the tiller",

and resulted in mass peasant uprisings. The shoddy initial planning of the Indian Government in dealing with the peasant uprising and the use of kinetic means without attacking the root causes of the problem may have subdued the uprising in 1970s, but not enough to prevent its emergence again in a more virulent form in the 1990s.

Fortunately, the influx of specially trained Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF), massive development programs undertaken by the government, and the indifferent attitude of the urban populace towards the insurgency the next phase of surrounding the urban areas by these liberated zones seems to be a distant possibility. The double-digit growth in almost all the states and the inclusive development brought in the form of Focused Area Approach (FAA) and Integrated Action Plan (IAP) is changing the class composition of the proletariat very rapidly. The inability to mobilize the masses in urban areas is forcing the Naxalites to use terror tactics to bolster its struggle but the increased violence is isolating the movement and denying it sanctuaries in the urban centers.

EFFECTS BASED APPROACH

The state government's erstwhile kinetic approach involving the SPF and Salwa Judum merely helped Naxalism grow by committing atrocities and human rights violations against the poor or relocating them out of their traditional habitat without proper rehabilitation and resettlement options. The Central Government before late 1990s merely allocated funds to the state governments and distanced itself from the conflict citing Naxalism to be an internal problem of the states. Whereas, the present Effects Based Approach (EBA) features direct involvement of the Central Government in planning and to a certain extent in execution of the various policy directives. EBA has a very wide scope and the decision to exercise this option

should be undertaken based on the thorough understanding of the various factors driving the conflict.

The EBA is influencing the perceptions and thinking of an adversary by to win the battle of wits and compel him into subjugation while avoiding attrition to one's own forces. EBA primarily relies on the second and third-order effects of calculated attacks or actions undertaken to achieve specific, operational and strategic effects. EBA entails the synergized application of all instruments of national power to cripple the critical components of the enemy's war-waging machinery and shape the environment to one's advantage. The application of all possible national resources for EBA warrants the involvement of the highest political leadership in planning, and to an extent executing the Effects Based Operations (EBO). EBO may involve political, diplomatic, military or economic actions to influence the enemy's physical, information or cognitive domain and gain advantage that may be outside the ambit of conventional means. Some strategic gains possible with EBO, which may not require any fighting, are affecting the surrender of the enemy, causing defection in enemy ranks, gaining the support of the neutral population, and gaining access to superior intelligence.

India has successfully tried EBA in J&K, the hotbed of insurgency, to change the groundswell from insurgency to peace.³⁹ The Indian Army undertook Operation Sadbhavna (Goodwill) in Ladakh District of J&K in 2000, and since then has spread peace and stability to the entire state. The Indian Army facilitates local people in identifying, executing, and maintaining development projects for their community. The major focus areas of Operation Sadbhavna are essential services in remote areas, literacy, women empowerment, public health, and relief and rehabilitation. The Indian Army has managed to win over substantial alienated portion of the Kashmiri populace since the launch of Operation Sadbhavna in 1998. The Indian

Army has successfully handed over the interiors to the state police and the army is predominantly limited to manning the international borders. However, the EBA is protracted and continuous because of the socioeconomic lines of operation unlike the conventional operations where the rapid results might be achieved by utilizing kinetic means.⁴⁰ Having tried the options of purely kinetic means in the 1970s and predominantly economic means in the 1990s, the Indian government has now graduated to the EBA focusing on the whole of government approach.

THE STATE'S RESPONSE SINCE 2005

India has finally realized the magnitude and gravity of the Naxalite insurgency after leaving it to the states to try to resolve it as a mere law and order issue for five decades. The Central Government has taken up multifaceted initiatives similar to the Colombian COIN against FMLN supported by the United States (Plan Colombia) to counter the menace of Naxalism. The Central Government has now opted for a more holistic and integrated approach to the problem with an increased emphasis on population-centric means to eradicate the root causes of the insurgency, supported by professionally trained and well equipped security forces. The envisaged lines of operation are fairly akin to the Plan Colombia. The Central Government plans to overhaul the entire security apparatus, carry out holistic and inclusive development in the backward districts for amelioration of poor economic and social conditions, and establish monitoring mechanisms to enable speedy and effective implementation of the complete development process.

The Reform Process

The first step for EBA is to understand what effects are desired. After a detailed physical survey an expert study group identified the root causes of the insurgency in the each state and graded the districts in terms of potency of the Naxalite insurgency observed in each district. The expert study group identified 125 districts⁴¹ with Naxal presence of which 60 districts were identified as affected and 33 as the worst affected districts.⁴² The affected and worst affected districts are being targeted for specialized reform packages (including security operations and additional funding for development programs) under the Focused Area Approach (FAA). The rest of the country is undergoing regular reforms simultaneously to prevent the spreading of the insurgency to new areas.

Development programs undertaken in a district depends upon the potency of insurgency in that area as well as based on the human development index. Development programs undertaken for the worst affected districts are short-term high impact programs such as health camps, distribution of food and water, and provision of basic amenities. The medium and long-term programs such as education, communication, infrastructure, industries, and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) later on capitalize on the foundation laid by short-term programs.⁴³ The local population has ownership in identification, planning, execution, operating and monitoring of the projects, to fulfill the aspirations and demands of the populace. The Central Government has also set up a unified command structure at the central, state, and district levels to streamline the various lines of operation and maintain oversight for effective implementation of the strategy.⁴⁴

SECURITY REFORMS

Surgical operations have replaced the violence unleashed by the SPF and Sulwa Judum the right wing militia backed by Chhatisgarh State. The violent and repressive measures employed by Sulwa Judum to affect relocation of the populace to the relocation camps and their ineffective management of the relocation camps were stopped by the Supreme Court of India in July 2011 by disbanding Salwa Judum. The Chhattisgarh State Government has appealed the order arguing that Sulwa Judum plays a significant role in intelligence gathering and generating employment in the Naxal affected areas. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's verdict will rein in the violent methods of the Salwa Judum and improve the conditions of the relocation camps, if not shut them down entirely.⁴⁵ Moreover, the verdict of Supreme Court will also force the SPF to conduct operations themselves rather than depending upon the Sulwa Judum to play proxy for them in the wilderness.

Accurate intelligence is vital for successful operations in counterinsurgency (COIN). The entire intelligence infrastructure of the country has been reformed to enhance coordination and cooperation among the various intelligence agencies. The Central Government has raised new intelligence agencies to specifically for counter terrorism focusing on collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence at national level.⁴⁶ Sophisticated technology in terms of satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and aerial surveillance has also enabled increased precision in the search and destroy operations.

The military is predominantly providing training and advice. The Central Government regards Naxalism as essentially a law and order problem of the states and use of military would feed the insurgent's propaganda and would further alienate the affected populace. In addition to that the Indian Army's preoccupation with manning the international borders also makes the

employment of army in countering Naxalites a difficult proposition. The army has provided COIN and jungle warfare training to about 60,000 paramilitary personnel, until now and a Brigadier General is now empanelled with the Unified Command for advisory purposes. Other assistance by military is the provision of ex-army personnel for demining, establishment of a Sub-Area Headquarters with approx 15,000 troops in Chhattisgarh as quick reaction force, and provision of Indian Air Force helicopters for logistics and casualty evacuation.⁴⁷

CPF augments the State Police Forces (SPF) with additional disciplined and professional troops having vital COIN experience and modern weapons. By the end of 2011, 83 battalions of CPF were committed in anti-naxal operations, with 70 units of Central Reserve Police Force and 37 units of Indian Reserve battalions raised specifically for anti-naxal operations. CPF have opened 20 COIN and anti-terrorism schools to train the SPF, as well as the newly raised CPF battalions. The CPF are also honing their skills with the help of elite National Security Guards in heliborne operations and by training snipers for speed and precision. The intake of local youth as Special Police Officers (SPOs) has been increased significantly in the SPF and the CPF to assist in intelligence collection at grass roots level, as well as to generate employment and wean away able-bodied youth from insurgent cadres. The introduction of this "Sons of the Soil Concept" has provided employment to 14,000 local youth, sapping the possible Naxalite recruits away from insurgency.⁴⁸ The SPOs have proved to be force multiplier to the CPF and SPF with their knowledge of local terrain, language and customs have built up intelligence base and helped clarify the government's policies to the alienated populace.⁴⁹

Provision of a safe, secure, and supportive environment for developmental work is only possible with a professional and committed SPF. The Modernizing the Police Force (MPF) scheme launched by the central government focuses on ensuring a robust and strong police

presence in the affected areas to keep the insurgents at bay even after the withdrawal of the CPF. The scheme envisions overhauling the entire police setup, to include construction of new police stations for enhanced outreach and retraining and reequipping for enhanced precision and effectiveness. The states have changed their police doctrine to operate in small detachments of specialized units enabling quick and decisive action while reducing their footprints on ground, increasing the area of influence, and reducing the casualties.⁵⁰

SOCIOECONOMIC REFORMS

Even though India has recorded tremendous growth within the last two decades, it is still a country with 300 million poor people. Approx 32% of the Indian population is living below the poverty line.⁵¹ The Central Government has finally focused on eradication of root causes of the insurgency such as poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, and inadequate communication, infrastructure, and education facilities while keeping the rustic way of life intact. Although, most of the socioeconomic reform schemes cover all of India, some specialized schemes under the Integrated Action Plan (IAP)⁵² and extra funds are allocated for the backward and Naxal-affected districts under the FAA.

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), enacted by the Central Government in September 2005 ensures provision of legal time-bound employment to the unemployed for asset creation and community works in the rural areas. The scheme provides 100 days of employment in a year or pays unemployment allowance for sustenance to the applicant. The scheme generates employment for 25 million people annually for various development schemes, weaning away the populace from insurgency.⁵³ The Bharat Nirman (Nation Building) Scheme launched in year 2005 is a flagship program with a

combination of development plans focusing on providing drinking water, housing, irrigation, electrification, road connectivity, and rural telephone connectivity. The salient plans under Bharat Nirman are the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme, National Rural Health Mission, and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All). The all-encompassing program is an endeavor to have fast track habitat development in the neglected areas by leveraging the capability of the various plans under this single program. The total outlay for the program for 2011 has been US \$ 11.4 billion⁵⁴ {Indian Rupees (INR) 58,000 crore}.⁵⁵ However, the yearly spending of allotted funds on the projects is decreasing steadily by the user states due to either slow implementation or saturation of projects in an area. Though the rural housing and rural telephony has achieved more than 100% of the envisaged target of constructing 60 million rural homes, the program as a whole is still far from being a success. The progress reports of the various projects indicate only 58% of the rural roads, 60% of electrification, and 65% of the irrigation projects completed until now.⁵⁶

The Central Government started the Backward Districts Initiative scheme in year 2003 to promote infrastructure development and generate employment in the less developed districts of India. This initiative provides an alternative to agriculture in the 100 least developed districts and 35 worst Naxal affected districts of India. The Central Government allocated US \$ 0.34 billion (INR 1650 crore) for the year 2011 complimented by the state governments depending upon the specific requirements of each state. The scheme focuses on grass roots development by inclusion of the Gram Panchayats (Village Committees) in the planning and execution of the projects to enhance transparency, increase the sense of inclusion and ensure effective monitoring of ongoing projects.⁵⁷ To undertake fast track development of the backward districts the Central Government has come upon the IAP as part of the Focused Area Approach (FAA). Under the

FAA, 78 backward districts are allotted an additional US \$ 6.1 million (INR 30 crore) for two years to bridge the development gap at the earliest (see map in Appendix A).⁵⁸ The FAA focuses on short-term high impact programs for providing healthcare, drinking water, education and road connectivity. The scheme empowers the affected villages and district committee's to identify development projects according to the needs of the populace, and the money is allotted in phases to avoid pilferage and ensure timely completion of the projects.

Relief and rehabilitation schemes for the insurgents and the victims of insurgency are a big step in providing an option for the Naxals to renounce insurgency and provide succor to the victims of Naxal violence. The Central Government encourages surrenders by giving out cash rewards to the insurgents and by providing life insurance and vocational training along with a stipend for self-employment. Distribution of farmlands and providing healthcare and educational facilities for the insurgent's children is another feature of the plan. Unfortunately, the number of surrenders by insurgents over the years reflected suggests that the scheme not been a success, as shown in Figure 2.⁵⁹ Similar scheme launched for the victims of naxalite violence features payment of *ex gratia* financial compensation, pensions to families of deceased, free education for children, vocational training, employment to eligible dependents of the victim, and medical facilities to the injured.⁶⁰




Figure 2: Surrenders by Naxalite Insurgents⁶¹

Internally displaced people and flawed resettlement policies were another major source of discontent among the tribal population that is being addressed by the Central Government. The National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement, enacted in year 2007, protects the rights of the population affected by resettlements due to developmental projects, onslaught of Naxalite violence, or declaration of reserve forests. The policy protects the interests of all the people directly or indirectly dependent upon the concerned land. The salient features of the policy are the allocation of farm and residential land, employment opportunities, vocational training, and preference in awarding business contracts and opportunities. Provision of financial assistance for education, housing, transportation, and basic amenities such as health care, drinking water, roads, electricity, and sanitation is also instituted in policy.⁶² The policy also features mandatory inclusion of village committees of the affected areas in the planning and implementation of the project to ensure that their respective concerns are represented. The village and district oversight committees maintain vigilance on the complete process for redressal of grievances and conduct regular social audits of the projects.

The Forest Rights Act of 2006 is another ambitious legislation to recognize the individual and community rights of the forest dwelling population previously nullified under the Forest Conservation Act.⁶³ The act accords legal rights to the forest dwelling tribes to make use of the forest produce, grazing grounds, water resources, and cultivating grounds. At the same time, it also empowers the tribes to be the guardian of the forests to stop illegal use of the flora and fauna from the poachers and timber thieves.⁶⁴ The scheme has given a hope to the vast internally displaced population to resettle again in their native habitats without being exploited at the hands of corrupt government officials.

The Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (Education for All) scheme provides free elementary education to children between six to fourteen years of age under the 86th amendment of the Constitution of India, which made free and compulsory education a fundamental right. The scheme funds construction of new schools, improvement of existing facilities, provision of books, mid day meals, and scholarships to the children in less developed areas. Construction of hostels and residential schools have been taken up in the 35 focus districts to provide safe and secure education. Model School program provides facilities on par with Central Schools and has constructed 327 schools in 2009-10 and 384 schools have been approved for the year 2010-11. New facilities such as education city approved in year 2010 at the cost of \$ 200,000 (INR 98 Lacs) provides for education, residential and recreational facilities to the children of Dantewada district, one of the worst naxal-affected districts. Decent progress has been made in improving literacy in the Naxal affected areas. The progress in the literacy rate from 64.7% to 71% and 63.1% to 73.5% in year 2011 in Chhattisgarh and Orissa, the two worst affected states reflects a positive trend. Appendix B shows that this success has been achieved in all the areas affected by the Naxal insurgency. The scheme has been enormously successful in opening multiple avenues of employment for the poor solely dependent on forests or agriculture, thus ending their vulnerability to exploitation by corrupt officials and the feudal elites.⁶⁵

The Indira Awaas Yojana (Rural Housing Scheme) was launched in 1985 to provide decent housing for the poor. The scheme is financed on a 3:1 cost sharing ratio between the central and state government, where in the Central Government provides \$ 900 (INR 45,000) per housing unit { \$ 960 (INR 47,000) per unit in the hilly and difficult areas }. Since its inception, the scheme has enabled construction of 25.2 million houses with the vision of providing brick houses to the entire rural population by year 2017.⁶⁶ A sum of \$ 1.07 million (INR 5.2 crore) was

allocated from 2008 to 2010 with \$ 5,00,000 (INR 2.45 crore) more allocated for the year 2010-11, to construct one lakh houses in the Naxal affected areas. The scope of the scheme is being widened to include development of basic amenities such as water, sanitation, electricity, clean fuel, healthcare, and education as part of habitat development, not merely houses. The revised scheme envisions increasing the financial assistance as well as providing employment to the locals by integrating the Rural Housing plan along with other ongoing schemes such as the Bharat Nirman.⁶⁷

Monitoring Mechanism

Irrespective of the policies instituted the success of the same entirely depends upon the honest and sincere implementation of the laws and empowerment of the proletariat. Though the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Manmohan Singh, harps upon zero tolerance for corruption,⁶⁸ reports of independent human rights groups indicate serious drawbacks in the implementation of the policies by the government officials.⁶⁹ Central and State level Governments have put in place various oversight mechanisms to define policies, keep a check at the measures of performance, implement deadlines of the projects, and check pilferage of funds.⁷⁰

The Planning Commission of India has established a Naxal Management Division, looking after the political, social, and developmental aspects of the Naxal affected districts and undertaking policy decisions in light of the continuing progress of the ongoing programs. The Central Government has also identified separate ministries for Tribal Affairs, Rural development, and Panchayati Raj (Village Committee) to provide oversight and manage the government's policies. An "Empowered Group of Ministers" having the Chief Ministers of the affected states as members and the Union Home Minister as the chairperson has been set up to implement the ongoing projects and formulate new policies and projects for the different regions.

Review Groups headed by the Cabinet Secretary and Additional Secretary (Naxal Management) coordinates the efforts of the different Central Government agencies for development and security programs. To synchronize security with these efforts a Coordination Centre headed by the Union Home Minister with Chief Secretaries and Director Generals of Police (DGP) of the affected areas has been established to coordinate the COIN operations. District committees and village level committees instituted for various projects also maintain oversight over the various ongoing projects in the respective area and the Central government has made it mandatory to publish the progress of all the ongoing projects on websites of the particular schemes to assist public scrutiny and social audit of the various programs, increasing transparency and encouraging active participation.⁷¹

Effectiveness of the EBA

The present strategy of the Indian Government against the Naxalite Insurgency qualifies as an Effects Based Approach, as the socioeconomic reforms are the most significant component of the anti-naxalite operations, while the security operations provide the enabling environment conducive for these reforms to take place. Trends in violent incidents, surrenders by insurgents, economic growth, and implementation of the various development and social schemes by the government are a few indicators to gauge the efficacy of the EBA. The dramatic reduction of the Naxal violence by almost 50% in the year 2011 may be regarded as an aberration in view of the reduced number of surrenders and lack of indication that the insurgent cadres are shrinking. However, if the downward trend in violence continues, it should be attributed to the EBA, rather than a strategic Naxalite withdrawal. The average growth of 16% in the GDPs of the nine Naxal affected states except Jharkhand in year 2011, (Appendix C) and the overwhelming response to

the development schemes of the government are signs of success, which undermines the Naxal appeal. The popularity of the FAA and the tailor-made IAP for the 60 worst-affected districts prompted the government to include 18 more districts in the program on December 9, 2011.⁷² The FAA has enabled fast track development in the worst affected districts, while simultaneous reforms in the rest of the country are raising the standard of living of the proletariat across the whole nation, thus reducing the simmering discontent of rich and poor divide. This holistic and inclusive development has enabled overall growth of the Indian economy, reduced unemployment, and touched all aspects of the human development. All of this indirectly defeats the Naxal Insurgency, which is fueled by the discontent among the proletariat generated by grave economic and social disparity.

In addition to the economic development, the improvement in communications, road connectivity, and infrastructure has enabled improved outreach and increased responsiveness of the security forces inside the former Naxalite safe heavens. The influence of security forces is gradually permeating inside the previously unmapped virgin forests of DK and Abhujmarh, thus restricting the unabated use of these areas as safe heavens by the insurgents. The resurgence of government administration and provision of essential services and amenities in the insurgent infested areas is winning the confidence and support of the local populace. Improved intelligence networks and employment of local youth for intelligence collection is enabling efficient intelligence collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination for the conduct of intelligence based surgical operations. The Indian government is stressing upon peace, stability, and integration of the insurgents into the main stream as the measure of success rather than body counts and arms caches discovered.

However, the Indian Government is still very far from claiming victory in countering the Naxal Insurgency. Police reforms are still in their infancy and have yet to prove their effectiveness. The Naxalites still control vast swaths of jungles and the countryside and have the capability to strike with impunity. On the socioeconomic front reforms have still not touched all areas and 32 % of the Indian population is still living below the poverty line. The Indian Government has been able to pump money in the less developed and tribal areas owing to a robust national economic growth; however, the corrupt and slow-paced political and bureaucratic system is proving to be the biggest obstacle faced by the EBA.

The socioeconomic reforms are failing to accomplish the desired targets and many schemes are proving to be flawed and ill-planned, resulting in dry irrigation canals and hand-pumps and tube-wells without water.⁷³ There are many reports surrendered insurgents and tribals being cheated by the corrupt government officials. In effect, the EBA has turned into a profitable business for politicians, bureaucrats, and insurgents in some of the districts.⁷⁴ Despite all of the setbacks, the government has been adapting its response according to the groundswell and the potency of the insurgency in the affected areas. The EBA has been able to change lives of millions of poor and oppressed people by providing them employment or other means of making a living and other basic amenities which would not have been possible under a kinetic approach towards the insurgency.

Conclusion

After five decades of futile COIN operations, the Indian Government decided to employ the EBA. The Indian Army in 'Operation Sadbhavna' (Goodwill) successfully employed this approach for countering a longstanding insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Government is undertaking a multipronged approach to tackle the Naxalite Insurgency.

Professional and well equipped CPF and SPF are being employed to undertake intelligence based precision operations to clear the insurgent-dominated areas and safeguard the population from the insurgent onslaught. Indian military and specialized units are augmenting the training, logistics and intelligence infrastructure of the CPF and SPF of the states.

Socioeconomic reforms are also being implemented, with special emphasis on the Naxal affected districts achieved by undertaking development packages such as MNREGA, IAP, and Bharat Nirman. A large segment of population living in abject poverty has been benefitted by such schemes inducing a positive impact regarding the government's policies, distancing them from the insurgency, and isolating the insurgents from their support bases. For the first time in the last decade, the instances of the Naxal violence has declined, with the reduced number of killings in the year 2011 and reports of divergence of ideologies in the ranks of the insurgents leaning towards peace.⁷⁵ Impressive annual growth of 34.6% and 31.26 % in the GDP of Chhattisgarh and Bihar, the hotbeds of Naxalite Insurgency are positive indicators of the efficacy of the EBA strategy. However, the key to the success of the EBA strategy is the honest and effective implementation of the various tools and instruments of national power by the government. India is lacking in the implementation of the strategy, because of corruption and bureaucratic hurdles in the Indian Administrative system. If the Indian Government is able to plug the pilferage of funds and accomplish the desired targets, the Naxalite insurgency will surely succumb to the EBA.

Shift to EBA in COIN is possible. Lessons learned from previous COIN campaigns such as Philippines and Columbia indicates that COIN has to be whole of government approach, however very few counterinsurgents undertake this approach. Insensitivity towards the root causes of the insurgency and aspirations of the affected populace cloud the counterinsurgents

wisdom and rationality, prompting him to exercise kinetic option for COIN. However, a careful and thorough study at the grass roots level, followed by tailor made region specific strategies will surely have a positive impact among the insurgent dominated areas. Unified command synergizes the various lines of operation to have a cumulative effect of all the instruments of a nation's power on insurgency as seen in Columbia. Decentralized execution with the inclusion of the affected populace is another vital factor. The decentralization improves responsiveness, whereas inclusion adds ownership of the local populace to the development plans. A carefully thought EBA with honest implementation will create a positive environment which will stifle the insurgency and create a wedge between the insurgents and their support bases forcing them to abandon the insurgent cause and join the societal mainstream rather than antagonizing the populace.


DISTRICTS UNDER THE IAP



78 DISTRICTS UNDER THE INTEGRATE ACTION PLAN


Source : <http://win2vin.wordpress.com/2012/02/23/tackling-left-wing-extremism-naxalism-recent-measures-taken-by-union-and-state-governments/>

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Source : Census of India 2011, Chapter 6 , State of Literacy, 37

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Economy & Population of the Federal States for Year 2011

Rank	State/Union Territory	Region	Population (2011) in 000	Indian Rupee (Ten Million)	US Dollar (Billion)	Growth Rate (YoY)	%age of Total GDP	Per-capita Income (INR)
1	Maharashtra	West	112,373	1,029,621	\$224.12	14.23%	14.09%	83,471
2	Uttar Pradesh	North	199,581	588,467	\$128.09	13.42%	8.05%	26,051
3	Andhra Pradesh	South	84,666	567,636	\$123.56	19.44%	7.77%	60,458
4	Tamil Nadu	South	72,139	547,267	\$119.13	17.94%	7.49%	72,993
5	Gujarat	West	60,384	481,766	\$104.87	12.21%	6.59%	63,961
6	West Bengal	East	91,348	443,644	\$96.57	10.76%	6.07%	41,469
7	Karnataka	South	61,131	398,893	\$86.83	15.73%	5.46%	59,763
8	Rajasthan	North	68,621	303,358	\$66.03	18.76%	4.15%	39,967
9	Kerala	South	33,388	268,183	\$58.38	16.44%	3.67%	59,179
10	Haryana	North	72,598	257,793	\$56.12	18.82%	3.53%	92,327
11	Madhya Pradesh	North	25,353	240,239	\$52.29	11.07%	3.29%	27,250
12	Punjab	North	27,704	221,332	\$48.18	10.97%	3.03%	67,473
13	Bihar	East	41,947	213,073	\$46.38	31.26%	2.92%	20,069
14	Orissa	East	103,804	186,356	\$40.57	10.53%	2.55%	36,923
15	Chhattisgarh	East	32,966	129,718	\$28.24	34.66%	1.78%	44,097
16	Jharkhand	East	25,540	106,696	\$23.23	-2.85%	1.46%	29,786
17	Assam	North-East	31,169	104,218	\$22.69	12.70%	1.43%	30,413
18	Uttrakhand	North	10,117	77,580	\$16.89	24.70%	1.06%	68,292
19	Himachal Pradesh	North	12,549	52,426	\$11.41	21.26%	0.72%	58,493
20	Jammu & Kashmir	North	6,856	47,709	\$10.39	10.23%	0.65%	33,056
21	Goa	West	1,458	29,873	\$6.50	15.42%	0.41%	132,719
22	Tripura	South	3,671	16,328	\$3.55	11.80%	0.22%	38,493
23	Meghalaya	North-East	2,964	14,645	\$3.19	17.14%	0.20%	48,383
24	Nagaland	North-East	2,722	10,933	\$2.38	25.85%	0.15%	21,434
25	Manipur	North-East	1,981	9,198	\$2.00	22.51%	0.13%	29,684
26	Arunachal Pradesh	North-East	1,383	7,263	\$1.58	6.12%	0.10%	51,644
27	Mizoram	North-East	1091	6,179	\$1.35	9.69%	0.08%	45,982
28	Sikkim	North-East	608	5,652	\$1.23	19.24%	0.08%	48,937

India's Total GSDP	6,666,455	\$1,451.12	91.23%
India's Total GDP	7,306,990	\$1,590.55	

Source : State-wise "Nominal GDP" of India for 2011,
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